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Global value chains, trade in value added and modification of countries' international production specialization

Abstract. Nowadays about 80 % of international trade is realized within global value chains coordinated by multinational companies, which simultaneously generate the main part of value added flows in the world. This determines the relevance of the research and the purpose of the article that is to reveal the directions of global value chains influence on the international trade and the countries' international production specialization, to identify opportunities and risks for integrating countries in the context of their foreign trade development. As a result of the research, the directions of the global value chains influence on the countries' international production specialization are identified, the opportunities and risks for integrating countries from the standpoint of their foreign trade and specialization development are determined. Many distortions of the international trade development indicators and the role of certain groups of countries in the international trade, resulting from the defining influence of global value chains on its development, are revealed. It is proved that global value chains create a new reality of international trade and international labor division, lead to changes in the trade dynamics, its commodity and geographical structure, as well as significant modification of the countries' international production specialization.

Keywords: global value chain, multinational enterprise, international trade, trade in value added, international production specialization.

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Introduction

Nowadays global value chains (GVCs), created on the base of foreign direct investment (FDI), technologies, goods and services flows regulated by multinational enterprises (MNCs), have a dominant effect on the international trade development. Currently, about 80% of international trade is realized within GVCs [15], which simultaneously generate the most of value added flows in the world. The international production fragmentation within the framework of GVCs, largely based on FDI, contributes to

notable changes in the international division of labor. The trade flows within GVCs, estimated in terms of value added, describe real processes taking place in modern international trade and allow giving an adequate assessment of the countries' competitiveness, their investment attractiveness and their international production specialization.

The above determines the relevance of the research and the purpose of the article that is to reveal the directions of GVCs influence on the international trade and the countries' international production specialization, to

identify opportunities and risks for integrating countries in the context of their foreign trade development.

Methodology

General scientific methods, systematic approach, economic-statistical methods were used in the research. The information basis of the study are the databases of UNCTAD, WTO, Eurostat and Central statistical offices of the Visegrad Group countries. In particular, the approach of international trade evaluation in terms of value added that is implemented in the database «Trade in Value Added» (TiVA), created in 2013 by WTO and OECD, is used in the article. The TiVA latest version (2016) [7] includes information on 63 countries and 34 sectors of the world economy for the period 1995–2011.

The methodological basis of the research is presented by the works of such scientists as B. Kogut, E. Penrose, O. E. Williamson, C. H. Fine, R. N. Langlois, P. Robertson, J. C. Jarillo, E. Lorenz, W. Powell, H. B. Thorelli, M. Porter, who studied the value chains functioning. At present, two large theoretical schools of GVCs researchers exist: internationalism, which representatives (G. Gereffi, R. Kaplinsky, P. Gibbon) carry out research mainly at the macro level, and industrialism (J. Humphrey, H. Schmitz), which adherents prefer analysis at the micro level, studying the experience of industries and clusters.

Among Russian scientists studying GVCs and network economy are V. Idrisova, S. Kadochnikov, V. Kondratiev, Yu. Kukushkina, S. Lukyanov, E. Meshkova, V. Sokolov; among Belarusian scientists are A.A. Bykov, E.L. Davydenko, A.V. Danilchenko, D.S. Kalinin, G.A. Shmarlouskaya.

Nowadays the GVCs development led to the integration of GVCs theories into the theories of international trade. So, to define a new type of trade, G. Grossman and E. Rossi-Hansberg proposed the “trade in tasks” concept instead of the “trade in goods” concept [4]. R. Baldwin and A. S. Blinder also concluded that the trade in finished goods was largely replaced by trade in intermediate goods and services, which was also associated with the GVCs development, but

as before, was explained by the Ricardian trade theory. Later R. Baldwin and F. Robert-Nicoud introduced a model in which both trade in goods and trade in tasks arise [1].

Discussion

Globalization of production and trade, which is one of the defining features of today's world economy, has led to creating and rapid development of GVCs. That is, that the production process is broken down into several stages which are located across different parts of the world. Many other terms have been used to describe this phenomenon, including fragmentation, fractionalization, dispersion, disintegration, unbundling, outsourcing, etc.

The international production fragmentation within the framework of GVCs, largely based on FDI, contributes to notable changes in the international division of labor and countries' international production specialization. As noted in the Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Report (2015), prepared by ESCAP specialists, as a result of the increasing fragmentation of production within the framework of the GVCs, countries do not need to develop complex vertically integrated industries to participate in international trade, the development of capacities at certain production stages, for certain tasks is sufficient.

It creates an opportunity for even small developing countries with limited capital to actively participate in international trade in goods and services, create jobs and added value. As a result, more countries are able to benefit from trade, which contributes to the redistribution of trade and specialization gains from developed to developing countries.

At the same time, despite these opportunities, from the perspective of developing comparative advantages and trade, there are also negative aspects of GVCs development for developing countries. On the one hand, GVCs do indeed reduce the entry barriers to the lower stages of the value chain, making it easier for developing countries to get access to the world markets. On the other hand, the conditions that facilitate access to GVCs can simultaneously serve as an

obstacle for developing countries to reach a higher technological level and industrialization. This is explained by the fact that the most accessible stages of GVCs are usually characterized by limited links between MNEs with suppliers and consumers, are associated with low added value industries, a low level of development of the institutional environment and absorption capacity of the economy, which ultimately can lead to the so-called «surface» industrialization which reduces the perspectives for modernization through technology transfer and innovation. Thus, more than 85% of total exports of industrial products from the least developed countries are labor-intensive, resource-intensive and low-tech industrial products that require low-skilled labor. Moreover, the integration into GVCs can lead to closure or reorganization for assemblies or simple components production of an enterprises purchased by foreign owners (examples of Polish companies Zamech and Dolmel).

Moreover, participation in GVCs can lead to a narrow specialization of developing countries based on an equally narrow technological base and, accordingly, to a high degree of dependence of their economies on MNEs. An example is the transformation of Mexico and Central American countries into the centers of industrial assembly. This also applies to the electronics and automotive industries in Central and Eastern Europe. Relatively narrow production specialization of the Visegrad group countries, formed in accordance with the interests of MNEs, made their economies more vulnerable during crisis.

There is a risk of formation of an enclave economy of MNEs, weakly connected with the domestic economy of the country. It happens when creation of MNEs affiliates does not lead to an increase in labor productivity in the national economy or imitation activities of national companies, partly due to the weak economic relations of MNEs with local firms and the labor market. So, in the Visegrad group countries due to the EU legislation that did not allow a selective approach to FDI there were cases of FDI concentration at 100% foreign-owned enterprises, poorly integrated into the national economy. For

example, in the Czech motor vehicle industry the Czech-owned companies are totally absent from the first tier suppliers and are only linked by casual technological relationships to foreign-owned multinational subsidiaries which has limited vertical spillovers of foreign-owned multinational subsidiaries on the indigenous industry. India in electronics GVCs is well presented in integrated circuit design, with most of the top multinationals having an office in India, but the design activities are carried out in foreign multinationals branches with minimal spillover effects to the domestic economy.

It should be noted that the creation of domestic MNEs by developing countries creates the prerequisites and opportunities for a significant reduction in the risk of remaining at the lower levels of GVCs, on the whole contributes to the more effective integration into GVCs and the capture of greater benefits from the processes of capital transnationalization.

Thus, MNEs, through FDI, production fragmentation and GVCs creation, determine and modify the production specialization of the countries of the world. Countries in Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, and to some extent South Asia, particularly China, are the primary beneficiaries of GVCs participation and its contributions to industrial development and economic growth. So, among the 61 economies in the OECD TiVA database 7 Asian economies ranked among the top 20 economies by importance of GVCs participation for their manufactured exports, among them are Cambodia, Singapore, Republic of Korea, Taiwan Province of China, Malaysia, Thailand and Viet Nam. As for China or India, although the percentages are lower for the larger Asian economies, the absolute values of GVCs activity in China or India are higher [17].

Asia's integration into GVCs over the past two decades is traditionally pronounced for backward linkages, reflecting the region's expanding role in assembly stages of production. But for the last years China has undergone a substantial shift away from assembly to more complex GVCs activities, especially since 2008. China has changed its role in international trade through rapid industrial upgrading, which is reflected

in the large scale of its exports and imports of intermediate goods and services via both simple and complex GVCs trade networks. One striking feature of China's trade in the twenty-first century is the increase in the domestic value-added component of exports, across all manufacturing industries, but the apparel and electronics GVCs illustrate this phenomenon the best.

Trade theory predicts that trade patterns will be influenced by relative factor endowments, and that hypothesis carries over to prediction of the location of activities within GVCs. China's experience supports the hypothesis, with specialization in labour-intensive processing activities in the 1980s and upgrading to more skill-intensive activities as wages increased in the 2000s. A corollary of this upgrading was the shift of the most labour-intensive activities to lower wage locations such as Cambodia or Lao PDR. Among the case studies, Samsung's decision to locate its new mobile phone assembly operations in Viet Nam rather than China is the clearest example of factor cost determining GVCs participation.

The development and outcomes of GVCs participation vary significantly at the country and sectoral levels.

Asia has become an important player in manufacturing alongside North America and Europe. Japan lost its lead role in the creation of value added in Asia's manufacturing sector. China developed into a major source of value added, and the role of China, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China as suppliers of intermediate inputs in medium high-technology-intensive industries increased. Although the specialization of Viet Nam and India in low technology-intensive industries increased, they recorded higher growth rates in medium technology-intensive industries. So, regional value chains presented a safe bet for India and Viet Nam to increase participation in low-tech industries, and in medium- to high-tech industries for China. Global value chains opened up growth opportunities for China and Viet Nam in medium high-tech industries, while India joined expanding GVCs in medium-tech activities [17].

ASEAN countries and China have drastically renewed a development strategy so as to take advantage of production networks and accelerate industrialisation. Now they know how to jump-start industrialisation by participating in production networks. Rather than raising an entire industry by improving overall investment climate in a country as a whole, better investment climate local to specific industrial estates would suffice to start inviting production blocks. This makes the initiation of industrialisation much easier. China, Malaysia, Thailand and others established such a model, and now Cambodia and Laos have started attracting machinery parts producers. Malaysia, Thailand, and China, as well as Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam to a lesser extent, are at the stage of constructing efficient industrial agglomeration, in which local firms and small medium enterprises have ample opportunities to link with multinationals and upgrade innovation [17].

Participation in GVCs changes a lot China's international production specialization. From the perspective of global production networks, the rise of China has dramatically changed the whole topology of GVCs from both the demand and supply sides. This clearly reflects the fact that China is no longer just an "assembly factory" exporting huge amounts of final goods to the world. China has changed its role in international trade through rapid industrial upgrading, which is reflected in the large scale of its exports and imports of intermediate goods and services via both simple and complex GVC trade networks [17]. More and more countries, especially in Asia, have become highly dependent on China's supply of value-added and its demand for value-added directly and indirectly via GVCs. So, from the view of global production network topology, China played an increasingly important role as both a supply and demand hub in GVCs trade activities.

Moreover, one striking feature of China's trade in the twenty-first century is the increase in the domestic value-added component of exports across all manufacturing industries. The apparel and electronics GVCs illustrate well this phenomenon. In electronics, Chinese firms

have taken lead-firm status in many domestic and global value chains. The large and booming domestic market helped. From that springboard, Chinese brands have moved into global markets; 21 % of mobile phones sold worldwide in 2015 were Chinese brands (up from 1 % in 2007) and 21 % of televisions (up from 11 % in 2007).

Results

The GVCs impact on the countries' international production specialization, as well as on the international trade dynamics and structure, can be traced through the main trends in the GVCs development, among which are the following.

1) Developed countries, on average, are more integrated into GVCs than developing economies and economies in transition. So, according to UNCTAD, the degree of developed economies integration in GVCs is on average 60 %, of developing economies and economies in transition – 56 and 57 % respectively [16]. However, these data vary significantly across countries and industries (figure 1).

2) Developed countries, on average, are also characterized by a higher dependence of their exports on intermediate goods imports in comparison with developing economies and economies in transition. So, in 2017, the average level of imported value added in the total

exports of developed countries amounted to 32 %, of developing countries – 28 %, of economies in transition – only 13 %. Moreover, as a rule, large developed states are less dependent on intermediate goods and services imports within GVCs than small open economies due to less diversified economies of the latter. So, in 2017, for the United States, the share of foreign value added in exports amounted to only 13 %, for Japan – 21 % (while the GVC participation index of these countries was equal to 46 and 48 %, respectively) [16]. However, the United Kingdom, China and Germany are exceptions to this rule.

3) Countries that are major exporters of raw materials and services in the world economy participate in GVCs mainly on the export side. So, the Russian Federation is inferior only to Saudi Arabia in the share of national value added in exports. At the same time, a high share of national value added in exports is also characteristic of countries specializing in trade in services (USA, UK, Italy, France, India), as well as of some offshore centers (Cyprus, Hong Kong).

Countries that specialize in production or assembly of final products from imported components (Republic of Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, Hong Kong, Singapore, etc.) participate in GVCs mainly on the import side [9]. The greatest dependence on imported components is typical for developing countries




Figure 1 – GVC participation Index in 2017, %
Source: [16].




Figure 2 – Average GVCs length in the world economy

Source: [5]

in East and Southeast Asia, Central America.

A high level of participation in GVCs, both on the export and import side, is characteristic of developed countries that produce high-tech components (Germany, France) [9]. At the same time, as noted, developed countries with large domestic markets can be relatively closed, since many value chains are entirely located on their territory (USA, Japan).

4) The greatest degree of production fragmentation within GVCs is observed in the processing industry, in particular in the production of telecommunication equipment, automotive and electronic industries, metallurgy. In these industries, the share of imported value added in exports, as a rule, is significantly higher than the national average. For example, in Japan for the transport equipment industry it is equal to 40 %, in Hungary for the electronic industry it reaches 85 %, in China, South Korea and Mexico in the electronic industry it is equal to 75 % [6].

Extractive industries and service sector are characterized by a low share of foreign value added in exports, and their involvement in the GVCs, as a rule, occurs through the contribution of value added to industrial goods.

5) The degree of participation of developing countries in GVCs is growing up, at the same time their integration in international production is uneven and highly depends on the income

level. So, the share of developing countries in the world trade within GVCs has increased from 20 % in 1990 to 30 % in 2000 and to more than 40 % today [3]. However, many poorer developing countries are still little involved in GVCs, except for the export of natural resources [15].

Among the developing economies, the economies of East and Southeast Asia are the most dependent on imports of parts and raw materials (in 2017, in these countries the share of foreign value added in exports amounted to 34 %). The exports dependence on imports is significantly less in Africa, West Asia (14%), South America (14%) and West Asia (15%), where natural resources and low value added goods dominate exports. A low level of exports dependence on imports is also observed in the countries of South Asia (13%), largely due to the high share of services in their exports (for example, India).

6) In recent years, there has been a slowdown in the GVCs development, which is manifested in a decrease in the GVCs average length (figure 2) and a decrease in the share of imported value added in the world exports (figure 3).

It seems possible to explain this trend by the following reasons. Firstly, the progressive deindustrialization of developed countries and the prospect of their industrial competitiveness loss put forward the question of reindustrialization and re-shoring. So, in recent years, manufacturing




Figure 3 – The international trade dynamics based on gross indicators and indicators in value added, trillion US dollars
Source: authoring based on UNCTAD data

companies of OECD countries are increasingly moving their production back to the territory of investing countries (for example Apple, General Electric, Ford Company, etc.) [8]. This trend is clearly manifested in the Chinese economy that in recent years faced large capital outflows [14]¹. Secondly, the GVCs shortening is affected by the recent global financial crisis, increased financing difficulties and transaction costs. Thirdly, the growing military-political tension in the world and natural disasters also affect the GVCs functioning. So, after the tsunami in Japan in 2011, a number of companies reduced their value chains, especially in the automotive and electronic industries.

7) Many MNCs value chains represent now rather regional value chains, than global. They are mainly concentrated in three centers: North and Central America, Europe and the Asia-Pacific region. So, already in 2010, the share of intraregional flows of goods, services and investments amounted in North and Central America to 61 %, in Europe – 57%, in East and

Southeast Asia – 42 % [10]. In economies in transition, Latin America and Africa, regional value chains are less developed. A key role in the regional value chains development was played by the increase in the amount of bilateral investment agreements and regional trade agreements.

The GVCs development and their determining influence on international trade create a number of methodological problems in assessment of global goods and services flows. Firstly, a double counting problem arises. So, the gross value of world exports repeatedly includes the cost of intermediate products, which leads to an overestimation of international trade volumes due to double counting. As a result, the role of countries-producers of final goods is overestimated. Secondly, the countries' trade balances cease to reflect the real imbalances in bilateral trade. So, the US trade deficit with China in value added is 25 % less than in gross indicators [11]. Thirdly, the problem of determining the real exchange rate arises, as its calculation is based on gross indicators. Fourthly, it leads to distorted estimation of foreign trade on the basis of indicators such as Balassa index, PRODY, EXPY. Fifthly, gross exports no longer reflect the country's endowment with production factors. As noted by R. Baldwin, country characteristics

¹ Another reason for the capital outflows from the country is that China, as once a source of cheap labor, is characterized by increasing production costs now and is becoming less attractive for MNCs, giving way to countries such as Bangladesh, Vietnam and Cambodia.

Table 1

Structure of international trade in goods and services calculated in gross indicators and indicators in value added

	Gross indicators				Indicators in value added			
	2010		2017		2010		2017	
	trillion US dollars	%	trillion US dollars	%	trillion US dollars	%	trillion US dollars	%
Developed economies	10,969	57,2	12,958	56,1	7,569	54,8	8,811	54,4
Developing economies	7,504	39,1	9,453	41,0	5,628	40,8	6,806	42,0
Economies in transition	0,701	3,7	0,672	2,9	0,610	4,4	0,584	3,6
All countries	19,168	100	23,082	100	13,807	100	16,157	100

Source: authoring based on UNCTAD data

no longer coincide with the characteristics of exported goods [2].

The study revealed the following distortions in the international trade assessment, that are caused by the accounting of international trade on a gross basis in the conditions of the GVCs dominant influence on its development.

1) *Distortion of the dynamics of international trade in goods and services.* So, in 2017, the gross volume of international trade in goods and services amounted to 23.08 trillion US dollars, while accounted in value added – only to 16.16 trillion US dollars² (figure 3).

2) *Distortion of the geographical structure of international trade.* The calculations show that in 2017 the share of developed countries in the world gross exports amounted to 56.1 %, while taking into account only trade in value added – to 54.4%³ (table 1) [8]. It seems possible to explain it by the fact that the exports dependence on imports in developed economies (32 % in 2017) exceeds this indicator in developing economies and economies in transition (28 and 13 %, respectively).

3) *Distortion of the sectoral structure of international trade.* Assessing international trade in gross indicators results in underestimating

of the services share in international trade. It can be explained by the fact that the data on international trade do not reflect the value added of services included in the value of goods. At the same time, many services participate in trade indirectly, as production and trade in agriculture and manufacturing are increasingly dependent on services. For example, in the clothing manufacturing, physical components, including labor and fabric, make up only 9 % of a t-shirt price, and 91 % are formed by a wide range of services, such as retail, logistics, banking, marketing, etc. [12]. As a result, the share of services in value added exports is significantly higher than in gross exports. So, the share of services in global gross exports is about 20 %, while almost half (46 %) of the value added of world exports is created in the tertiary sector [13].

The results of the calculations, presented in the table 2, show that the share of services in the total exported value added is equal to 59 % in developed countries and 43 % in developing economies and economies in transition⁴, which exceeds significantly the share of services in their exports calculated in gross indicators.

Thus, the analysis of international trade on the basis of gross indicators leads to a distortion

² Calculated by the author on the basis of UNCTAD data.

³ Calculated by the author on the basis of UNCTAD data

⁴ Calculated by the author on the basis of UNCTAD data.

Table 2

Share of services in the world exports calculated in gross indicators and indicators in value added, %

Countries	Gross indicators	Indicators in value added
All countries	19,5	46
Developed economies	24,1	59
Developing economies and economies in transition	13,7	43
Source: authoring based on UNCTAD and WTO data		

in the estimates of its dynamics, geographical and sectoral structure, and accordingly, its development trends. And as a result it leads to inadequate assessments of the competitiveness and investment attractiveness of industries, countries and regions. Thus, in order to clarify the extent of countries' involvement in the global economy, it seems useful to assess in indicators in value added not only the GVCs development trends, but also the international trade trends (including foreign trade of EAEU countries).

Conclusion

The research made it possible to substantiate the following conclusions.

1) The GVCs development creates a new reality of international trade, leads to changes not only in dynamics, but also in the architecture of international trade, its commodity and geographical structure. Currently, it is trade flows within GVCs, estimated in terms of value added, that describe the real processes taking place in modern international trade and allow to give an adequate assessment to the countries' competitiveness and their investment attractiveness. At the same time the GVCs development modifies significantly the countries' international production specialization, creates additional opportunities and risks for integrating countries from the standpoint of their foreign trade and specialization development.

2) The international division of production process that is carried out by MNEs in different countries has become a defining feature of the modern global economy. Increasingly,

international production, trade and investment are inextricably being tied within the framework of GVCs that in its turn significantly change the international production specialization of the integrating countries and made industrialization easier in some ways, and more challenging in others. So, countries can industrialize by producing intermediate goods or by performing specific activities during a particular stage of production, instead of having to possess all necessary industries to produce and export final products. However, the technology requirements for entering into GVCs are more demanding than ever. At the same time, concerns abound regarding the depth of industrialization in the long run if countries remain trapped in lower value-added activities along the GVCs. On the one hand, GVC-related trade can lead to "narrow industrialization," in which a country specializes in low-skill, low-productivity activities that are less proper to long-term sustainable development. On the other hand, MNEs can help diversify the economies of the countries, especially dependent on raw material or primary agricultural product exports.

3) The international trade assessment on the basis of gross indicators in conditions of the decisive GVCs influence on its development leads to distorted results, namely: it distorts the dynamics, geographical and sectoral structure of international flows of goods and services, overestimates international trade volumes and the role of developed countries in it, underestimates the share of services in international trade flows. In this regard, in order to clarify the extent of

countries' involvement in the global economy, it seems useful to investigate not only the GVCs development, but also international trade trends (including foreign trade of EAEU countries) on the base of indicators in value added.

4) MNEs, through FDI, production fragmentation and GVCs creation, determine and modify the production specialization of the countries of the world. Countries in Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, and to some extent South Asia, particularly China, are the

primary beneficiaries of GVCs participation and its contributions to industrial development and economic growth. Asia's integration into GVCs over the past two decades is particularly pronounced for backward linkages, reflecting the region's expanding role in assembly stages of production. By contrast, China has undergone a substantial shift away from assembly to more complex GVC activities, especially since 2008. The shift is most evident in GVC trade in the electronics industry.

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Жаһандық өндірістік желілер, қосылған құн саудасы және елдердің халықаралық өндірістік мамандануын өзгерту

Аннотация. Қазіргі уақытта халықаралық сауданың шамамен 80% - ы трансұлттық компаниялар үйлестіретін жаһандық өндірістік желілер аясында жүзеге асырылады, олар бір уақытта әлемдегі қосылған құн ағындарының негізгі бөлігін құрайды. Бұл зерттеудің өзектілігі мен мақаланың мақсатын анықтайды, ол жаһандық өндірістік желілердің халықаралық саудаға және елдердің халықаралық өндірістік мамандануына әсер ету бағыттарын анықтаудан, интеграцияланатын елдердің сыртқы саудасын дамыту тұрғысынан мүмкіндіктері мен қауіптерін анықтаудан тұрады. Зерттеу нәтижесінде жаһандық өндірістік желілерді дамытудың елдердің халықаралық өндірістік мамандануының өзгеруіне әсер ету бағыттары, олардың сыртқы саудасы мен мамандануының дамуы тұрғысынан интеграцияланатын елдер үшін мүмкіндіктер мен тәуекелдер анықталды. Халықаралық сауданың даму көрсеткіштерінің бірқатар бұрмалануы және ондағы елдердің жекелеген топтарының рөлі жаһандық өндірістік желілердің оның дамуына шешуші әсеріне байланысты анықталды. Жаһандық өндірістік желілер халықаралық сауда мен Халықаралық еңбек бөлінісінің жаңа шындығын тудыратыны, сауда динамикасының, тауарлық және географиялық құрылымының өзгеруіне, сондай-ақ елдердің халықаралық өндірістік мамандануының айтарлықтай өзгеруіне әкелетіні дәлелденді.

Түйін сөздер: жаһандық өндірістік желі, көпұлтты компания, халықаралық сауда, қосылған құн саудасы, халықаралық өндірістік мамандандыру.

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Глобальные производственные сети, торговля добавленной стоимостью и модификация международной производственной специализации стран

Аннотация. В настоящее время около 80% международной торговли осуществляется в рамках глобальных производственных сетей, координируемых транснациональными компаниями, которые одновременно генерируют основную часть потоков добавленной стоимости в мире. Это определяет актуальность исследования и цель статьи, которая заключается в определении направлений влияния глобальных производственных сетей на международную торговлю и международную производственную специализацию стран, выявлении возможностей и рисков для интегрирующихся стран в контексте развития их внешней торговли. В результате исследования определены направления влияния развития глобальных производственных сетей на изменение международной производственной специализации стран, возможности и риски для интегрирующихся стран с позиции развития их внешней торговли и специализации. Выявлен ряд искажений показателей развития международной торговли и роли отдельных групп стран в ней, обусловленных определяющим влиянием глобальных производственных сетей на ее развитие. Доказано, что глобальные производственные сети создают новую реальность международной

торговли и международного разделения труда, приводят к изменению динамики, товарной и географической структуры торговли, а также существенной модификации международной производственной специализации стран.

Ключевые слова: глобальная производственная сеть, многонациональная компания, международная торговля, торговля добавленной стоимостью, международная производственная специализация.

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